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Summary
Our cognitive ability to interpret the world around us is largely based on metaphor and
metonymy. Both of them let us see relations between unknown and known, remote and
near, invisible and visible, based essentially on similarity and contiguity between concepts.
The atomists created such a similarity or analogy between visible Greek alphabetic script
and the invisible world of atoms. Contemporaneous biologists continue to use this model
of thinking in molecular biology. By various examples – from biblical interpretation to
the world of science and technology – the pervasiveness of such models of thinking (and
partially their time-bound character) is shown. In the past, a big problem was European
mainstream thinking, insisting on relations between words instead of concepts in the case
of metaphor.
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Unsere kognitive Fähigkeit, die Welt um uns zu interpretieren, beruht weitgehend auf Me-
tapher und Metonymie. Beide erlauben es uns, ausgehend von den Prinzipien von Ähn-
lichkeit und Kontiguität zwischen Konzepten, Beziehungen zwischen Unbekanntem und
Bekanntem, Entlegenem und Naheliegendem, Unsichtbarem und Sichtbarem zu sehen.
Die Atomisten schufen solch eine Ähnlichkeit oder Analogie zwischen der sichtbaren grie-
chischen Schrit und der unsichtbaren Welt der Atome. Zeitgenössische Biologen nutzen
dieses Denkmodell weiterhin in Bezug auf molekulare Biologie. Durch vielfältige Beispiele
von der Bibelexegese bis zurWelt derNaturwissenschat undTechnikwird dieweite Verbrei-
tung solcher Denkmodelle (und teilweise auch ihre Zeitgebundenheit) aufgezeigt. In der
Vergangenheit bestand ein großes Problem in der Hauptströmung europäischen Denkens,
die auf Beziehungen zwischenWörten statt zwischen Konzepten, wie im Fall der Metapher,
beharrte.
Keywords: Metapher; Metonymie; Konzepte; Kognition.
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Let me start with a citation from one of the Presocratics, Anaxagoras (c. 499 – c. 428
BC): ۅ̱̺̀ څ̵̬̦̳́ ̼۩ ̵̩̱̾۲̴̵̩.1 It can be translated as “the seeing of the invisible is
mediated by what is visible [the phenomena]”. A famous article that the supervisor of my
doctoral thesis published at age 27 attributes this citation to the activity of Anaxagoras
as a physician, ‘the invisible’ being the illness and the ‘phenomena’ the symptoms of
the condition to be diagnosed.2 That there is another, somewhat diﬀerent, in my eyes
far more interesting interpretation, will become evident ater a short detour into the
history of linguistic thought.
II
According to Quintilian (Institutes of Oratory), there exist a dozen so-called tropes. Petrus
Ramus, under his French name Pierre de la Ramée (1515–1572), reduced them to four:
metonymy, irony, metaphor and synecdoche.3 Since metonymy and synecdoche can be
taken together, synecdoche being a special case of metonymy (use of an element for the
class or the class instead of the element); and since irony is somewhat diﬀerent, given
that speech is used in order to mean the contrary of what is being said, two basic tropes
will remain: metaphor and metonymy.
These tropes are intimately linked with linguistic thought, the most famous ex-
ample being perhaps Roman Jakobson with his metonymic and metaphoric poles of
language, which have led to two basic types of aphasic disorder – similarity and conti-
guity disorder.4 “Every form of aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment … of
the faculty either for selection and substitution [similarity, paradigmatic aspect] or for
combination and contexture [contiguity, syntagmatic aspect]” (p. 254).
This intimate relationship was most clearly spelled out at the beginning of the
1920s, by a French author Jakobson doesn’t seem to be familiar with, Léonce Roudet
(1861–1935). In 1921, Roudet published a groundbreaking (if largely unnoticed) arti-
cle, “Sur la classiﬁcation psychologique des changements sémantiques”,5 showing that
metaphor and metonymy underlie linguistic change. – Here are some of his thoroughly
phenomenological considerations:
1 Diels and Kranz 1960, fragment 59B 21a.
2 Diller 1932. Reprinted in Diller 1971, 119–143.
3 Quintilianus troporum genera duodecim facit,
metaphoram, synekdochen, metonymiam, antono-
masiam, onomatopoeiam, catachresin, metalepsin,
epitheton, allegoriam, periphrasim, hyperbaton,
hyperbolem. At quatuor tantum sunt, metonymia,
ironia, metaphora, synecdoche. (1549: Rhetoricae
distinctiones in Quintilianum, p. 79.)
4 “Two aspects of language and two types of apha-
sic disturbances”, ﬁrst published in Jakobson 1956,
55–82 and reprinted in Jakobson 1971, 239–259.
5 Roudet 1921.
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French text English (my translation)
Les idées et les mots forment dans la conscience
de chaque individu deux systèmes distincts
quoique solidaires. D’un côté les images de
choses et les idées générales qui sont à l’état la-
tent dans la conscience sont unies les unes aux
autres par les liens multiples de l’association
par contiguïté et de l’association par ressemblance.
D’un autre côté les images verbales, dont l’en-
semble constitue la langue, forment aussi un
système bien lié. Il y a entre elles des rapports
que Saussure a déﬁnis avec précision et qu’il
a appelés des rapports syntagmatiques et des rap-
ports associatifs.
Concepts and words constitute in the con-
science of an individual two systems that are
distinct, although solidly joint. On the one
hand, the images of things and the general
ideas that are in a latent state in the conscience
are mutually linked by multiple relations of
association by contiguity and association by sim-
ilarity. On the other hand, the sum of ver-
bal images that make up the language form
a well-linked system, too. In between these
images are relations Saussure has precisely de-
ﬁned, terming them syntagmatic and associative
[since 1929, linguists have used paradigmatic
in place of this latter term].
The distinction between the level of concepts and the level of words, combined with the
relations of contiguity and similarity, can be visualised in the following scheme:
Contiguity Similarity
Level of concepts Changements résultant d’une Changements résultant d’une
association par contigüité association par ressemblance
entre les idées. entre les idées.
metonymy metaphor
Level of words Changements résultant des Changements résultant des
rapports syntagmatiques entre rapports associatifs entre
les mots. les mots.
ellipsis, condensation folk etymologies, etc.
The following citation shows the psychological processes at work:
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French text (emphasis added) English (my translation)
On voit donc comment il faut considérer
les changements sémantiques. Ils peuvent
avoir des causes initiales extérieures à l’indi-
vidu et d’ordre social, mais la cause immédi-
ate de chaque changement est toujours un
phénomène psychologique qui a son siège
dans l’individu, à savoir l’eﬀort du sujet parlant
pour exprimer sa pensée au moyen de la langue.
Cet eﬀort fait apparaître dans la conscience un
système d’idées et un système de mots. Si les deux
systèmes sont en accord, l’eﬀort aboutit sim-
plement au rappel d’un mot; mais souvent il
y a disharmonie entre eux: l’eﬀort d’expression
cherche alors (p. 692) à les adapter l’un à l’autre.
Pour cela, il fait glisser le système des mots sur le
système des idées, ou au contraire, il fait glisser le
système des idées sur le système des mots. Dans
un cas comme dans l’autre, il en résulte un
changement du sens ou de la valeur d’un
mot.
Thus we see how semantic change has to
be considered. This change can start with
causes that are exterior to the subject and
of social order. But the immediate cause
of any change is always a psychological
phenomenon based in the individual, i.e.,
the eﬀort of the speaker to express his thoughts
through language. This eﬀort creates a system of
concepts and a system of words in the conscience.
If the two systems are in accordance, the
eﬀort simply leads to the recall of a word;
but oten there is no harmony between them: in
this case, the eﬀort of expression seeks (p. 692) to
adapt them mutually. In order to do so, it slides
the system of expressions over the system of con-
cepts or, conversely, it slides the system of concepts
over the system of expressions. In both cases, the
result will be a semantic change.
There is one basic distinction behind these considerations: the distinction betweenwords
and the concepts they stand for. If we look for a linguistic sign model that meets these
requirements, we will remain unsuccessful. Linguistic textbooks oﬀer us a triadic model
attributed to Charles Kay Ogden and Ivor Armstrong Richards, basically reﬂecting ideas
of stoicism (Fig. 1).
Here we ﬁnd an alternative at the apex of the triangle, “thought or reference”, which
leaves the relation fundamentally ambiguous. Is it reference? Is it thought? Would ‘con-
cept’ be a more adequate expression?
In order to do justice to the phenomena, we have to introduce a fourth corner,
transforming a triangular model into a rectangle or a trapezium. The interesting fact
is that, going back some centuries in history, we ﬁnd an adequate, much more reﬁned
model (Fig. 2).6
6 I am indebted to Roman Jakobson as regards the
discovery of this model. Speaking of the triangle of
Ogden and Richards, he used to say that the model
was usable in simple contexts, but that there was,
and now I remember his voice becoming grave, a
far better model proposed by a group of thirteenth-
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Fig. 1 (Stoic) sign model at-
tributed to Charles K. Ogden and
Ivor A. Richards 1923.
This model can be read as the psychological process involved in perceiving and naming
something and, conversely, in uttering something that will be understood by others.
First, I am confronted with an object, a matter of fact with certain properties (modi
essendi). Then I conceive of it, a highly active process for phenomenology: I make a con-
cept of it, classifying it as something I know (modi intelligendi). This happens beyond
language or beyond a particular language. Only then is the concept I have formed (the
idée in the wording of Roudet) transposed into a linguistic form, ﬁrst of all a certain
part of speech, thus relating to a certain (prototypical) modus signiﬁcandi. Nouns are in
principle endowed with the modus esse, verbs with the modus ﬁeri, etc.
One of the examples of the schoolmen uses the pain I endure. It may be expressed
as an exclamation (aiaiai!, aua!, vae mihi misero!), as a noun (dolor), as a verb (dolet). I
can express it as well with an entire sentence, Caput dolet vehementer. Most importantly,
since concepts transcend any particular language, I might as well say: I have a terrible
century schoolmen dubbed the Modists. In this con-
text he mentioned the names of Boethius and Si-
mon de Dacia (= Denmark), and perhaps also Siger
of Brabant. This led me to a thorough study of these
authors and my discovery of an evolution bordering
on the miraculous in their comments on the Latin
grammar of Donatus: a wholly uninspired enumera-
tion of the parts of speech of Latin was transformed,
by their comments (scholasticism means comment-
ing on extant texts), into a Universal Grammar, sup-
plemented by a syntax (diasynthetica) totally lacking
in the Latin author. The focus of their grammatical
thinking is on exactly this sign model.
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Fig. 2 The conception of the schoolmen translated into a scheme by the present author.
headache; je souﬀre d’un mal de tête épouvantable; me duele terriblemente la cabeza, päätäni
särkee paljon, etc. All these expressions boil down to a series of voces or dictiones. In reverse
order, from bottom right to bottom let of the model, we by now can understand a
well-known scholastic dictum: voces signiﬁcant (=signiﬁcatio) res mediantibus conceptibus, or
“words signify things by mediation through concepts”.
A further advantage of the model is that it can be applied to the entire hierarchy
of signs: words, groups of words, clauses, sentences, paragraphs, texts. Where the term
conceptus actually stands, we could as well ﬁnd script, scenario, macrostructure, all the more
since concepts may be represented in other media such as entire novels, ﬁlms, and the-
atre plays.
Thus the model of the mediaeval schoolmen is most eﬃcient: it copes with the dis-
tinction between the concept level and the word level crucial for the thinking of Roudet;
it is not restricted to words alone, its dynamism allowing the integration of higher lin-
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guistic units as well (I didn’t insist on this point for the sake of simplicity – it has some-
thing to do with the modi signiﬁcandi accidentales in the above scheme). It explains why
we can communicate (speak and understand) in more than one language, the main is-
sue or linchpin always being the introduction of a fourth pole, CONCEPTUS, into the
above model.
III
Now a ﬁrst conclusion seems to be appropriate: metonymies and metaphors are not
about words, but about concepts (the idées of Léonce Roudet). They are about concepts,
or relations between concepts, translated into linguistic expressions. In other words, this
time with George Lakoﬀ and Mark Johnson: metaphor (and metonymy, as we shall see
later) is amatter of concepts, not of words (the ﬁrst of the four persistent fallacies George
Lakoﬀ and Mark Johnson mention in the aterword of the 2003 edition of their most
inﬂuential book).7
With this knowledge we may return to my initial example, proﬁting from the
somewhat enigmatic fragment of Anaxagoras I started with. I shall explain the idea of
metaphors as models of thinking, with the help of a doctrine fostered by the atomists,
Leucippus of Abdera and his pupil Democritus.
What was it that made these men come up with an atomistic conception of matter?
Think of a bucket full of waterwith a small vessel in it. Youmove the vessel, and thewater
displaced at the bowwill smoothly be replaced at the stern.How could this be explained?
The idea they came up with was that water (and thenmatter in general) consists of small
particles moving relative to each other thanks to the void space in between.
In a nutshell, this is expressed in the following fragment: ̵̴̱̈́́ ̫̤̹ ̯̻̱̾ ̫̳̲̽ͅ,
̵̴̱̈́́ ̸̵̱̲̹̈́, ̵̴̱̈́́ ̴̵̰̭̹̈́, ̵̴̱̈́́ ̵̹̀̽̿̈́, ̵̴̱̈́́ ̷̹̱̦̿, ڕ̼̭ܻ̱ ̬۫ ډ̷̴̼̩ ̲̩ۯ ̵̵̲̭̈́
– we call something sweet, bitter, warm, cold, we speak of colour – but in reality, all
is made of atoms and void.8 As reported by Aristotle in his Metaphysics,9 this insight
was inspired by Greek script, i.e., the Greek alphabet: a series of letters with diﬀerent
7 Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1980 (citation from p. 244.)
The authors had the privilege not to be burdened
by a long European tradition of thinking about
metaphors. This is why they start – so to speak –
from scratch, conceiving of metaphors from the out-
set not as a matter of words, but as a matter of the
concepts behind the words. Nevertheless, the Eu-
ropean tradition would have oﬀered similar ways,
as we have seen for instance in the example of the
schoolmen or an author like Léonce Roudet. The
problem is that few persons were familiar with such
non-mainstream thinking, among them for example
Roman Jakobson. Hans Blumenberg, even without
the respective linguistic background, uses diﬀerent
wording to advocate a similar position (Blumenberg
1960); the problem is that his followers did not see
its far-reaching implications.
8 Diels and Kranz 1960, fragment 68B 125
(Democritus).
9 Metaphysics A4. 985 b4 sqq.
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shapes, in diﬀerent combinations and in diﬀerent spatial position, separated by space,
thus leading to an inﬁnite number of combinations. The basic principles holding for
atoms (the atomists use special terms not necessarily familiar to laypeople), illustrated
by letters, were:
Greek term of the principle Exempliﬁed by alphabet Translation (explanation)
and script
̶̼̤̱̺ AN vs. NA order
̬̱̩̰̱̫ۮ Z vs. N position in space (rotate letter Z
90 degrees clockwise)
ݗ̴̻̽۲̺ A vs. N shape
The example clearly shows that in this case “tà phainómena” seen as the elements of
Greek script, i.e., the concept of script and its letters, show the invisible inner structure
of matter. In other words: the concept of Greek script serves as a model of thinking,
showing in this case how matter should be organised.
In their use of the concept of alphabetic script as a model of thinking, the atomists
were forerunners of a group of scientists whose thinking to this day is entirely dependent
on this model: those in molecular biology.
Since 1953 the nucleotides, abbreviated as A, T, G, and C, are seen as the letters of the
genetic alphabet. RNA polymerase readsDNA sequences within their reading frame/s. This
process is called transcription, which happens because the transcription of DNA sequences re-
sults in transcription factors. The transcripts are subject to proofreading. The result is called
a copy, subject to further editing. The resulting string of mRNA will be translated into a
polypeptide. This is made possible because the triplets of nucleotides encode or are coding
for amino acids. The whole process is called gene expression.
Certain recurring sequences of letters are calledmotifs. They can be boxed (whereby
a box is drawn around sections of the written sequence), leading to names like TATA box
or to the transcription factors called homeoboxes.10
The genomes of many species are currently being deciphered. The results are stored
in large databasesmodelling the sequences of nucleotides as sequences of the letters A, T, G,
and C. The same is true for protein databases that symbolise one amino acid with one let-
ter (the sequence, “mgqtgkk…”, for instance, stands for methionine-glycine-glutamine-
threonine-glycine-lysine-lysine…). This means that sequences of nucleotides or amino
10 In the meantime, the genes containing homeoboxes
are even abbreviated as hox genes.
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acids corresponding to triplets of nucleotides ‘materialise’ – in a somewhat hybrid way
– in databases as sequences of letters.11
Could this concept of alphabetic script serving as a fundamental model of thinking
have been avoided? As a rule, biologists are not aware of the central metaphor they use.
The present author tried to avoid it at the beginning of the article cited above, using
instead the term ‘information’ – but this itself has a metaphoric origin with a strong
Aristotelian background.12 The problem that our thinking, even philosophical thinking,
depends on such central, pervasive metaphors (better: concepts) was addressed by the
late Hans Blumenberg in his book Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie.13
An author like Dante (familiar with the doctrines of the thirteenth-century school-
men, by the way) is fully aware of the problems linked with such models as we gain
from the visible world and apply aterwards to the invisible one – witness the idea of a
‘person’ named God:
Divina Commedia III (Paradiso), canto IV, English translation
40–45 (Beatrice speaking to Dante)
Così parlar convienesi all vostro ingegno,
però che solo da sensato apprende
ciò che fa poscia d’intelletto degno.
Per questo la Scrittura condescende
a vostra facultate, e piedi e mano
attribuisce a Dio, e altro intende.
To speak thus is adapted to your mind
Since only through the sense it apprehendeth
What then it worthy makes of intellect.
On this account the Scripture condescends
Unto your faculties, and feet and hands
To God attributes, and means something
else.
Having stated in a ﬁrst conclusion thatmetaphors (andmetonymies) are about concepts,
not words, this leads us to a second conclusion: metaphors are models of thinking – in
the sense of our interpretation of Anaxagoras’ fragment – insofar as they allow us to grab
and master, thanks to a central modelling concept, a domain which as oten cannot –
or cannot directly – be perceived by our senses.
11 For more information see Raible 2001.
12 Raible 2010.
13 Blumenberg 1960. Among his examples are the
‘naked truth’, Greek a-lètheia (what is not hidden);





Let me add some further examples, this time from the Bible, of central metaphors serv-
ing as models of thinking. In Deuteronomy XXI we read:
Deuteronomy XXI. 10–14 English Standard Version
10 si egressus fueris ad pugnam contra ini-
micos tuos et tradiderit eos Dominus Deus
tuus in manu tua captivosque duxeris 11
et videris in numero captivorum mulierem
pulch-ram et adamaveris eam voluerisque
habere uxorem 12 introduces in domum in-
imtuamquae radet caesariem et circumcidet
ungues 13 et deponet vestem in qua capta
est sedensque in domo tua ﬂebit patrem et
matrem suam uno mense et postea intrabis
ad eam dormiesque cum illa et erit uxor tua
14 sin autem postea non sederit animo tuo
dimittes eam libe-ram nec vendere poteris
pecunia nec opprimere per potentiam quia
humiliasti eam.
10 “When you go out to war against your en-
emies, and the Lord your God gives them
into your hand and you take them into your
hand and you take them captive, 11 and you
see among the captives a beautiful woman,
and you desire to take her to be your wife, 12
and you bring her home to your house, she
shall shave her head and pare her nails. 13
And she shall take oﬀ the clothes in which
she was captured and shall remain in your
house and lament her father and hermother
a full month. Ater that youmay go in to her
and be her husband, and she shall be your
wife. 14 But if you no longer delight in her,
you shall let her gowhere shewants. But you
shall not sell her for money, nor shall you
treat her as a slave, since you have humili-
ated her.
In this passage from Deuteronomy we would hardly recognize a metaphorical intention.
But read Origen. In his Homiliae in Leviticum he clearly uses to the above-cited passage
as a model of thinking:
Origen, Homiliae in Leviticum VII, My translation
PG XII, 227 [col. 490 sq.]
… et ego frequenter exivi ad bellum con-
tra inimicos meos, et vidi ibi in praeda[m]
mulierem decora specie. Quaecunque enim
bene et rationabiliter dicta invenimus apud
inimicos nostros, si quid apud illos sapien-
ter et scienter dictum legimus, oportet nos
I went out to war against my enemies, too,
and I saw among the captives a beautiful
woman. Since we ﬁnd things well and rea-
sonably said by our enemies, when we read
something of this kind, we have to purify it
from their science and to take oﬀ and cut
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mundare id et ab scientia quae apud illos est
auferre et resecare omne quod emortuum et
inane est, hoc enim sunt omnes capilli capi-
tis et ungulae mulieris ex inimicorum spo-
liis assumptae, et ita demum facere eam no-
bis uxorem, cum jam nihil ex illis quae per
inﬁdelitatem mortua dicuntur, habuerit, ni-
hil in capite habeat mortuum, nihil in ma-
nibus, ut neque sensibus, neque actibus, im-
mundum aliquid, aut mortuum gerat.
back what is dead and useless – such are
the hair of the head and the nails of the
woman we took out of the spoils of our en-
emies. And we thus may take her to be our
wife since she has nothing let anymore we
would call dead, given their lack of faith,
neither on her head nor on her hands.
In Origen’s interpretation, what was said of the puriﬁcation of a (female) body is now
applied to the puriﬁcation of pagan texts. Together with the simile of bees looking for
honey, thus transforming enemy ‘prey’ into something new and highly welcome, this
passage, cited time and again by Christian authors as the text of the beautiful slave, was
most important for the preservation of texts dating from antiquity.
The puriﬁcation example is at the same time a step to the fourfold sense of the
Scriptures (literal, allegorical, moral or tropological, and anagogical senses), an exegetic
practice developed by the Fathers of the Church: in Origen we ﬁnd only three of them,
with the anagogical one still lacking. The doctrine of the fourfold sense is intimately
linkedwithmetaphors asmodels of thinking, too. In the above case the idea (or concept)
of puriﬁcation (called ‘allegorical’ in this doctrine) is applied to a case seen as similar,
the puriﬁcation of pagan texts. How the doctrine of the fourfold sense of the Scriptures
was developed and how it worked can be seen in a basic four-volume text written by one
of the Jesuit polygraphers, Henri de Lubac (1896–1991): Exégèse médiévale : les quatre sens
de l’Écriture.14
V
Let me add some more examples for metaphors as models of thinking, ﬁrst biblical
ones, then examples drawn from the lay world. A well-known concept is the concept of
Christian life as a journey. According to the Dictionary of Biblical Imagerywe ﬁnd it as the
Path of Life,15 Way of Salvation,16 Walking with God, Virtuous Life, Followers of the
Way.17 Some citations from the Dictionary:
14 Lubac 1959–1964.
15 Mt 7:13–14.
16 E.g., Mt 3:3, Mk 1:2–3; Lk 3,4–5; Jn 1:19–25, etc.
17 Ryken, Wilhoit, and Longman 1998.
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– “As always, symbolic meanings grow out of the physical phenomenon. Walking on
a path involves choosing to enter on the path and to pursue it in a given direction,
progress toward a destination, making wise rather than foolish choices along the
way, taking care for safety and not getting lost, and arriving at a goal.”
– “The image of the path or way is pervasive in the Bible, with the references num-
bering approximately eight hundred.”
– “In biblical times walking was the most common way of going somewhere, even
over long distances. It is not surprising, then, that references to walking in the Bible
number well over two hundred (and in some versions nearly three hundred).”
– “Walking is one of the Bible’s vivid metaphors for how godly people should live,
both positively in terms of what to follow, and negatively in warnings about what
to avoid.”
– “Death as a metaphoric way” [Josh 23:14, 1 Kings 2:2; Ps. 121:7–8] “The image of
the path or way embodies a profound reﬂection on fundamental ethical themes,
the conduct of God and humanity, and the character of God’s salvation.”
The importance of this concept is so great that the technique used by Origen as regards
the beautiful slave from Deuteronomy can be applied, among other things, to the works
of Homer, especially to the Odyssey and to Ulysses’ journey home ater the fall of Troy.
Hugo Rahner published a book in 1966 (ﬁrst edition: 1957) with the title Griechische
Mythen in christlicher Deutung (Greek myths in Christian interpretation). It includes a
large chapter titled “Holy Homer”.18 In a book by the same author, published in 1964,
we ﬁnd a large part (of about 300 pages) under the heading ‘Antenna Crucis’. Its chapter
titles are self-explanatory: “I Odysseus am Mastbaum” (mast seen as cross, temptation
by the sirens); “II Das Meer der Welt”; “III Das Schiﬀ aus Holz”; “IV Das Kreuz als Mast-
baum und Antenne” (the cross as mast and yard); “V Das mystische Tau” (means the
Greek letter T); “VI Der Schibruch und die Planke des Heils” (plank, strake of salva-
tion); “VII Das Schiﬀ des Heils”; “IX Die Ankunt im Hafen. Schiﬄein des Petrus. Zur
Symbolgeschichte des römischen Prinzipats”; “VIII Die ArcheNoah als Schiﬀ des Heils”;
“IX Die Ankunt im Hafen”.19
The concept of the journey is not restricted to Christian contexts. You will ﬁnd it
in everyday contexts and everyday thinking – as is shown for instance by George Lakoﬀ
and Mark Johnson in their 1999 book: a purposeful life is a “journey”; a person living a
18 Rahner n.d.
19 Rahner 1964. Some years later, Hans Blumenberg
published his book on the importance of the con-
cept of ‘shipwreck’: Blumenberg 1979. By the way,
Hugo Rahner’s brother, Karl Rahner, held a chair
from 1967 to 1971 at the University of Münster,
where Blumenberg taught from 1970 to 1985.)
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life is a “traveller”; life goals are “destinations”; a life plan is an “itinerary”, etc.20 Another
quite interesting concept is the idea of love as war. Classical scholars will remember ﬁrst
of all the Ars amatoria of Ovid, especially book I, ix: militat omnis amans: love is war –
females are fortresses to be besieged – lovers should be young and strong (senilis amor
is ridiculous) – lovers have to endure everything (sleep on the ground in front of the
house, etc.) – the rival is an enemy;
custodum transire manus vigilumque catervas
militis et miseri semper amantis opus.
Getting past watchman’s hands, and enemy sentinels
is work for soldiers and wretched lovers.
In this context, all of us can remember works from world literature – as for instance
Stendhal’s Le rouge et le noir or the Memoirs of Giacomo Casanova.
It was a pleasant surprise for me to ﬁnd the same concept of ‘love as war’ in
Lakoﬀ/Johnson 1980. What is new in modern times is the two-sidedness of this war:
women ﬁght as well – we tend to call it ‘gender equality’. Witness the following state-
ments: he is known for his rapid conquests; she fought for him, but his mistress won out;
he ﬂed from her advances; she pursued him relentlessly; he is slowly gaining ground with
her; he won her hand in marriage; he overpowered her; she is besieged by suitors; he has to
fend them oﬀ ; he enlisted the aid of her friends; he made an ally of her mother; theirs is a
misalliance if I’ve ever seen one.21
VI
Let me brieﬂy mention two further models of thinking. One of the most important
inventions of mankind was the invention of script – we already saw one of its eﬀects in
the form of the concept behind the atomistic theory of Leucippus and Democritus, and
behind the approach molecular biologists have towards their subject matter. Now script
produces texts we can read in books. Thus the book as amodel for the world (going back
to Augustine) became a most inﬂuential concept, the so-called Book of Nature. God is
thought of as its author.We try to read this book, and since Galileo it has been written in
cipher, with mathematical symbols (reﬂecting the development of mathematics as the
most important ancillary science for natural sciences in the seventeenth century.) The
history of this concept and its pervasive eﬀect have been described by Hans Blumenberg
in another of his inﬂuential texts: Die Lesbarkeit der Welt.22
20 Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1999.




The second concept is the world (or universe) as a clockwork (horologium), inspired
by the large astronomical clocks constructed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
On the one hand, the world as a clockwork could be interpreted in a deistic perspective,
making of God the “grand [or even supreme] horologer”, the big or universal watch-
maker. This remains true of Leibniz (1646–1716). On the other hand there was a ‘physi-
cal’, far more progressive interpretation of the concept, fostered, e.g., by Johannes Kepler
(1571–1630).23 Judge for yourself:
Latin original My translation
Multus sum in causis physicis indagandis.
Scopus meus hic est, ut coelestem machi-
nam dicam non esse instar divini animalis,
sed instar horologii (qui horologium credit
esse animatum, is gloriam artiﬁcis tribuit
operi), ut in qua pene omnis motuum varie-
tas ab una simplicissima vimagnetica corpo-
rali, uti in horologio motus omnes a sinpli-
cissimo pondere.
I am very busy looking for the physical
causes. Here my goal is to show that the
heavenly machinery is not an image of a di-
vine being, but the image of a clockwork (if
someone believes the clockwork to be ani-
mated, then he attributes the merit of the
watchmaker to the clockwork itself), and to
show that nearly all variation of the move-
ments comes from one very simple mag-
netic force of the heavenly bodies; as in a
clockwork, all movements come from a very
simple weight.
VII
It stands to reason that such central concepts or models of thinking can be subject to
change according to the world in which we live. The concept of the world as a clock-
work has had its day. It was replaced by the concept of the network, in which no one is
forced to look for a moving force, e.g., an unmoved mover. In the case of ‘love as war’,
it was more or less an adaptation to the present style of life, the basic state of aﬀairs re-
maining identical. In other cases, models of thinking become obsolete and need more
explanation today.
23 Kepler in a letter to Herwart von Hohenburg. Cf.
Joannis Kepleri astronomi opera omnia. Frankofurti
a.M./Erlangae 1859. For the context I refer to the
great historian of science, Koyré 1961, 377 sq.
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Let me take one further, highly interesting example. Everyone is familiar with the
passage from Goethe’s Faust where Faust prepares a scholar for his studies (“Schüler-
szene”). Here the central concept is ‘thinking is weaving’.
Passage from the ‘Schülerszene’ English translation (italics mine)
Gebraucht der Zeit, sie geht so schnell von
hinnen,
Doch Ordnung lehrt Euch Zeit gewinnen.
Mein teurer Freund, ich rat Euch drum
Zuerst Collegium Logicum.
Da wird der Geist Euch wohl dressiert,
In spanische Stiefeln eingeschnürt,
Daß er bedächtiger so fortan
Hinschleiche die Gedankenbahn,
Und nicht etwa, die Kreuz und Quer,
Irrlichteliere hin und her.
Dann lehret man Euch manchen Tag,
Daß, was Ihr sonst auf einen Schlag
Getrieben, wie Essen und Trinken frei,
Eins! Zwei! Drei! dazu nötig sei.
Zwar ist’s mit der Gedankenfabrik
Wie mit einem Weber-Meisterstück,
Wo ein Tritt tausend Fäden regt,
Die Schiﬄein herüber hinüber schießen,
Die Fäden ungesehen ﬂießen,
Ein Schlag tausend Verbindungen schlägt.
Der Philosoph, der tritt herein
Und beweist Euch, es müßt so sein:
Use your time well: it slips away so fast, yet
Discipline will teach you how to win it.
My dear friend, I’d advise, in sum,
First, the Collegium Logicum.
There your mind will be trained,
As if in Spanish boots, constrained,
So that painfully, as it ought,
It creeps along the way of thought,
Not ﬂitting about all over,
Wandering here and there.
So you’ll learn, in many days,
What you used to do, untaught, as in a haze,
Like eating now, and drinking, you’ll see
The necessity of One! Two! Three!
Truly the intricacy of logic
Is like a master-weaver’s fabric,
Where the loom holds a thousand threads,
Here and there the shuttles go
And the threads, invisibly, ﬂow,
One pass serves for a thousand instead.
Then the philosopher steps in: he’ll show
That it certainly had to be so:
Das Erst wär so, das Zweite so,
Und drum das Dritt und Vierte so;
Und wenn das Erst und Zweit nicht wär,
Das Dritt und Viert wär nimmermehr.
Das preisen die Schüler allerorten,
Sind aber keine Weber geworden.
The ﬁrst was – so, the second – so,
And so, the third and fourth were – so:
If ﬁrst and second had never been,
Third and fourth would not be seen.
All praise the scholars, beyond believing,
But few of them ever turn to weaving.
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Where does this appreciation for the loom and the activity of weavers come from? Me-
chanical looms were introduced during the eighteenth century, contributing essentially
to the so-called Industrial Revolution. For the previous few centuries, and until the be-
ginning of the nineteenth, men of standing had worn stockings. And one particular
loom was invented for the production of such stockings. This “métier à faire des bas”, a
very sophisticated machine, was then seen as the summit of technical know-how. One
of the longest articles of the Grande Encyclopédie was dedicated to exactly this machine.
It was written by Diderot himself, who had spent about three months learning its func-
tion and how to perfectly operate this kind of loom. What made it worth the eﬀort for
him and some of his contemporaries was that this loom represented nothing less than
the essence of thinking:
Citation from the Encyclopédie, My translation (italics mine)
article BAS (stocking)
Le métier à faire des bas est une des ma-
chines les plus compliquées & les plus
conséquentes que nous ayons : on peut la
regarder comme un seul & unique raisonne-
ment, dont la fabrication de l’ouvrage est la
conclusion ; aussi regne-t-il entre ses parties
une si grande dépendance, qu’en retrancher
une seule, ou altérer la forme de celles qu’on
juge lesmoins importantes, c’est nuire à tout
le méchanisme.24
The loom for stockings is one of the most
complex and consequent machines we pos-
sess: you can see it as one single reasoning
process, leading to the product as its conclusion.
This is why there exists such a degree of mu-
tual dependency among its parts that taking
away a single one or changing the form of
those we regard as less important is detri-
mental to the entire mechanism.
The importance in contemporary technology of the use of metaphors, viz. the underly-
ing concepts, has been aptly described by Karlheinz Jakob. The eighteenth century was
indeed a century of machines.25
VIII
In order to conclude (and for the sake of a comprehensive view of the matter), let me
add some hints as to the inﬂuence of concepts on our language itself. The reader will
24 Passage from the beginning of the article BAS
(stocking), second volume of the ﬁrst edition of the
Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des
arts et des métiers, dating from 1751. The orthography
is authentic. Jacques Proust, an expert on Diderot,
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remember that this was the problem Roudet wanted to explain. A ﬁrst point has to do
with one of the themes popularised by Lakoﬀ and Johnson:26 body concepts are central
in the vocabulary and the grammar of individual languages. This was one of the topics
of research of the late Peter Koch, whose projected and partly realised Dictionnaire Éty-
mologique et Cognitif des Langues Romanes (DECOLAR) treats exactly the topic of body
parts and their semantic evolution. The Latin caput (head) has for instance undergone
a semantic change to ‘le chef’ in French, ‘the chief’ in English. This corresponds to se-
mantic similarity of the concepts, whereas it would be contiguity in the case of Latin
coxa (hip)→ French cuisse (thigh). Koch and his collaborator Paul Gévaudan give many
quite sophisticated examples of a reﬁned, linguistic version of Roudet’s ﬁndings, this
time including even the level of words (which I naturally was not interested in) and
not only the level of ideas/concepts.27 The second point is that grammaticalisation pro-
cesses very oten start from body concepts, too. Take the notion of the self (ego) – it may
be derived, e.g., from the concepts of ‘head’, ‘belly’, ‘body’. This topic has found great-
est interest among linguists. Bernd Heine, a scholar with a broad view not subject to
any Eurocentric bias (since he is a specialist in African languages) has been particularly
engaged in this discussion.28
An example from my own experience with Romance and Creole languages is per-
haps at issue. All of us have a concept of action. Actions have a beginning, amiddle phase
and an end. Additionally, all of us can imagine a phase before the onset of an action and
a phase ater its end. Now, what can be conceived can be linguistically expressed, too.
In particular, the phase before the onset and the phase ater the end of an action are the
sources of continuous eﬀorts leading to new forms: the expressions for the pre-initial
phase tend to become new future forms (‘I am going to swim’, ‘I will swim’, French ‘je
vais nager’, etc.). On a global scale, there exist perhaps only ﬁve types of expressions for
this phase. The Latin one was deontic (‘I have to sing’, cantare habeo, source of nearly all
Romance synthetic future forms). The expressions for the post-terminal phase tend to
become new perfective and then perfect forms (think of Latin habeo cantatum, ‘I have
ﬁnished singing’, source of the Romance perfect forms like French ‘j’ai chanté’).29
26 Lakoﬀ and Johnson 1999.
27 Gévaudan and Koch 2010.
28 Heine, Claudi, and Hünnemeyer 1991; Heine and
Kuteva 2002; Heine and Kuteva 2007.




Let me terminate these considerations with some conclusions.
(1) As was already shown by phenomenology and Gestalt psychology (decidedly the-
ories of perception), some basic operations exist in our mind: the most important
ones utilise recognition on the basis of the relations of contiguity and similarity. In
the case of metaphors, these relations are not given per se, but created by ourselves.
(2) These operations work from concepts, not from their linguistic counterparts (the
words or sentences).
(3) Thusmetaphor andmetonymy are amatter of concepts, not of words (the ﬁrst of the
four persistent fallacies Lakoﬀ/Johnson 1980 mention in their aterword of 2003).30
(4) A concept applied to another conceptual space creates either contiguity (and thus
metonymy) or similarity (and thus metaphor). This was the second, far more inter-
esting interpretation of Anaxagoras’ fragment.
(5) In order to become fully aware of this fact, one has to change one’s sign model. The
appropriate one is, e.g., the one fostered by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century,
certainly not the misleading one of Ogden and Richards.
(6) Our reasoning is of necessity metaphoric or metonymic – the number of states of
aﬀairs or objects to be designed being unlimited, whereas the vocabulary of histor-
ical languages is always restricted. This leads to polysemy as a natural consequence
– the meaning of words thus depending on the context in which they are uttered.
(Think, as a simple example, of the Trash icon on your computer or of a lover besieg-
ing his lady.) This kind of meaning change was exactly the point made by Léonce
Roudet.
In order to show that all this works just as well for the contiguity of concepts, I will end
with an extra: a series of metonymies we all are familiar with.
30 “The ﬁrst fallacy is that metaphor is a matter of
words, not concepts. The second is that metaphor
is based on similarity. The third is that all concepts
are literal and that none can be metaphorical. The
fourth is that rational thought is in no way shaped
by the nature of our brains and bodies.” (Lakoﬀ and
Johnson 1980, 244).
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X
We are familiar with taboo domains and activities in our everyday life. We are not al-
lowed to speak of such matters of fact directly – lots of examples can be found today
in the domain of so-called political correctness. Now one of the vices of modern West-
ern societies is alcoholism. When speaking of someone’s relative drunkenness, beware
of naming it as such. Never tell someone that s/he is intoxicated. Most expressions re-
lating to taboos resort to contiguous activities or states. In the case of alcoholism, there
is a quite large quantity of such solutions. A considerable part of the following expres-
sions comes, by the way, from the Dogood Papers of Benjamin Franklin (Paper No 12, 10.
IX.1722).31
Expressions for a taboo activity
Contiguity between concepts (→Metonymy)
Contiguous concept (Mostly) metonymical expressions
Relaxed mood Merry, mellow, ﬂying high, high, pretty well-entered
(Germ. aufgeräumt), to be in one’s altitudes
Positive eﬀects, preparation for the
‘hard’ life
To tie one on, to take one for the road, nightcap, the
cup that cheers; shots, jolts an eye-opener, a pick-me-
up
To straighten up oneself To refresh the inner man, to repair the tissues, to wet
the whistle
Reduced perceptive faculty Fuddled, see two moons, the sun has shown upon
him, blind, cockeyed, conked, feeling no pain,
jagged, pie-eyed, seeing double
Reduced speaking faculty To clip the King’s English (Germ. e.g., eine schwere
Zunge haben)
31 “And as the Eﬀects of Liquor are various, so are the
Characters given to its Devourers. It argues some
Shame in the Drunkards themselves, in that they
have invented numberless Words and Phrases to
cover their Folly, whose proper Signiﬁcations are
harmless, or have no Signiﬁcation at all. They are
seldom known to be drunk, tho’ they are very oten
boozey, cogey, tipsey, fox’d, merry, mellow, fuddl’d, groat-
able, Confoundedly cut, See two Moons, are Among the
Philistines, In a very good Humour, See the Sun, or, The
Sun has shone upon them; they Clip the King’s English,
are Almost froze, Feavourish, In their Altitudes, Pretty well
enter’d, &c. In short, every Day produces some new
Word or Phrase which might be added to the Vocab-
ulary of the Tiplers: But I have chosen to mention
these few, because if at any Time a Man of Sobriety
and Temperance happens to cut himself confoundedly,
or is almost froze, or feavourish, or accidentally sees
the Sun, &c. he may escape the Imputation of being
drunk, when his Misfortune comes to be related.”
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Reduced mobility To be almost frozen, groggy, half shot, paralyzed,
palsied, petriﬁed, plastered, shellacked, skunked,
smashed, stiﬀ
Reduced equilibrium control To be listing to the leeward, squiﬀed, three sheets to
the wind
Reduced accessibility To be corked, tight (Germ. jemand ist völlig zu)
To be full of liquid To be blotto, ﬂoating, greased, juiced, loaded, satu-
rated, tanked, spizzled, having a drop too much,
Concomitant activity of the body To hoist a few, to bend the elbow with one’s cronies,
to have somenips, swigs, slugs, to have a slug, to have
a snootful, (cf. Germ. sich einen hinter die Binde
gießen)
State ater the event To have a katzenjammer, hangover, the horrors, a big
head, a bit of a glow on, to be blasted, boiled, fried,
gassed, stewed, stoned, under the inﬂuence
Belittlement of the quantity To take a quick one, to need a wee dram before din-
ner (Germ. ein Bierchen trinken)
Pub crawls To be on a bender, on a spree, on a toot
Other names of alcohol Booze, hooch, sauce, snake oil, the grape, redeye, a
drop too much
Thus metaphors and metonymies are central notions, reﬂecting, among other things,
the way we perceive, think and speak, be it as commoners or as scientists; in short: how
we cope with the world around us.
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